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ABSTRACT
Lessons from the history of US school reforms and empirical analysis have
painted a picture of schools as complex institutions producing a product that is
influenced by the various choices made by parents and school bureaucracies
who respond to institutional incentives.  School vouchers change the incentives
faced by these agents.  This paper finds that when parents can choose
schooling independent of housing, greater residential integration results, which
brings with it much better equity properties than a more simple analysis would
imply.  While the fears by some that schools will become increasingly
differentiated under voucher policies are well founded, this greater
differentiation does not have to imply greater inequities in educational
opportunities.  In fact, under some plausible scenarios, the greater
differentiation of schools leads to greater equity and greater efficiency in both
public and private schooling.
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tnechyba@leland.stanford.edu.The proposal of introducing competition into the market for schools has a long
history1.  Beginning with Friedman’s suggestion in the 1950's that such
competition will reduce inefficiencies and increase the responsiveness of
schools to the diverse and changing needs of parents and children, the idea of
empowering parents to discipline schools has become a lightening rod for
academic and public debates, with some predicting that private school vouchers
are the panacea to cure all ills of centralised public education and others
implying it will result in nothing less than the end of civilisation as we know it.
As in all discourses characterised by such divisive rhetoric, the truth probably
lies somewhere in between.  Few real world policies have only positive
consequences, and most give rise to winners and losers.  But with the limited
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experience we currently have with real world voucher programs, there is wide
room for continuing disagreements that have few roots in empirical facts.
In particular, while it is true that Friedman and the Chicago School have
successfully persuaded countries like Chile to implement comprehensive
voucher programs, the idea has become a serious policy issue in the United
States only recently.  At this time, several small publicly and privately funded
voucher initiatives are in place in a few US cities, but it is difficult to draw large
conclusions from such experiments because of their limited and targeted
nature.  Furthermore, it is problematic to draw large policy inferences for
countries like the United States and New Zealand from experiences in countries
like Chile, given the very different cultural, social and historical settings.  A
thorough understanding of the issues relevant to the voucher debate in different
settings must therefore rest on a thorough understanding of the history and
institutions into which vouchers are to be introduced and must draw on the
lessons we have learned about education within the context of these
institutions.  This calls for a systematic approach that clarifies the channels
through which such proposals impact parents, children and schools and that
links these channels to empirically relevant data.
During the next 45 minutes, I will attempt to propose such a more reasoned
analysis by combining what we have learned from past education policies with
what researchers tell us about how schools function and how institutions
change.  I must apologise at the beginning, however, for the many references to3
specific US experiences that I will make during this talk, but it is within this
context that much of the research on schools as well as most of my own
experience and knowledge lie.  It is my suspicion that the lessons learned from
this analysis extend beyond US borders, and I am here in part to learn more
about the connection between problems in education faced by the US and
those challenging other countries like New Zealand.
I will therefore begin by giving you a brief outline of the history of education
policy in the United States that has led several states in the US to the brink of
jumping into a full scale private school voucher experiment.  Next, I will relate
these historical lessons to the academic literature on schools and suggest that
parents and school bureaucracies operate within institutional settings that
provide them with incentives which have direct links to school quality.  Finally, I
will try to use this information to shed light on the potential of vouchers to
address efficiency and equity problems in public education, and I will present
you with some estimates from some of my own work.  My goal, however, is not
to persuade you of any precise estimates I may have derived, but rather to help
clarify our thinking about the precise channels through which vouchers are likely
to make a difference.
Let me begin, then, with a brief overview of the reasons underlying the current
public call for private school vouchers in the United States.  As many of you
know, primary and secondary education has historically been a local
government responsibility in the US, with public schools being funded and4
controlled by nearly 15,000 different school districts.  At a time when
transportation and commuting costs were high, these school districts were
usually quite heterogeneous as complementarities between doctors, carpenters,
farmers and so forth forced different types of households to live within close
proximity to one another.  As commuting costs declined during this century,
however, the organisation of public schools at such a local level began to
introduce a force into household location choices that helped cause households
of different types to segregate into different school districts.  In particular, high
income families began to have an increasing incentive to live in separate,
mostly suburban, school districts in order to share a larger property tax base
used to fund their schools and in order to take advantage of positive peer
effects that, as I will argue shortly, are tied to socioeconomic characteristics.  In
order to protect this tax base and these peer effects from low income families
wishing to share in good public schools, immigration into high income school
districts by low income families was often successfully prevented through
exclusionary zoning rules that prohibited the building of low income housing.
Fiscal capacity for funding public education therefore began to vary across
school districts, as did the fiscal need arising from peer effects.
Quite apart from the class based residential segregation this introduced in much
of the country, the peculiar racist policies in Southern state legislatures led to
separate public school systems for white and black children in 15 of the 50
states.  With insufficient political will in state and federal legislatures to overturn
these racially motivated policies, civil rights advocates began to turn to the court5
system to challenge education policy.  In one of its prouder moments, the US
supreme court, in a unanimous decision, declared racially separate public
schools in the South to be unconstitutional in 1954 and launched an era of
racial desegregation in public education.  While few today challenge the wisdom
of this landmark court ruling, it did add even more relevance to the class based
residential segregation force already in place.  Far from equalising educational
opportunities across students, therefore, racial desegregation of schools led to
the exit of both whites as well as an emerging black middle class from
traditionally minority dominated central cities, and differentiation of suburban
school districts along income and school quality lines continued to increase.
In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down racially separate public
schools in the South created an opening for frustrated school reformers to turn
to courts in other dimensions of school policy.  In particular, given the wide
disparities in funding of primary and secondary schools across different school
districts, parents from poor districts began to challenge the constitutionality of a
locally financed education system that yielded such wide disparities.  While the
US supreme court refused to become involved in these suits and argued that
this was a state matter, state courts, beginning with a landmark decision in
California in 1971 but now extending to a majority of states, have become
increasingly involved in forcing greater centralisation of public school funding.
Over the past three decades, this has caused the initial uniformity of local
financing and control of schools across the US to give way to as many different
state policies as there are states.6
California, for instance, has abandoned local financing and with it local control
of schools and has switched to a centralised state system with almost equal per
pupil spending across all schools, while states like New Hampshire still rely very
much on local funding and control, and other states have devised various state
aid formulae intended to decrease but not eliminate school spending
differences.  This has given us many different natural experiments, and several
lessons from an analysis of these experiments have emerged.
First, centralisation of school finance to the state level has invariably led to
centralisation of control of local school policy at the state level.  In California, for
example, parents complain of an inability to successfully provide input to their
pubic schools because local ideas are generally blocked by sweeping state
rules on how schools are to be organised.  Second, as state education policy
has become more centralised, the power to control public education seems to
have shifted to a growing education bureaucracy often dominated by
increasingly powerful teacher unions, and the empirical evidence seems to
indicate a negative correlation between school outcomes and unionisation of
teachers.  Third, centralisation has led to declining overall quality of public
schools as measured by various output indicators, with the California public
school system slipping from its generally recognised superiority in the 1960's to
now ranking close to the bottom of the 50 states.  Finally, contrary to the stated
purpose of reformers, equalisation of education spending has not led to any
substantial equalisation of educational opportunities.  Both parental perceptions7
and objective test scores suggest that school quality varies among districts as
much now as it did prior to the equalisation reforms.  All this reinforces evidence
from the economics of education literature that suggests that financial resources
are far from the only important input into the production of good schools, and
that institutional factors, school bureaucracies and parents play an important
role.  It has been an unfortunate byproduct of court direction of school policy in
the US that much of our focus has been taken away from these factors and that
educational opportunity has incorrectly become synonymous with educational
spending.
Throughout this period, historical trends of increasing spatial income
segregation have continued, and pockets of dreadful public schools that
resemble jails more than places of learning have emerged in increasingly
isolated and minority dominated central cities.  It is here above all that
frustration has reached such levels that policymakers are seriously turning to
more radical alternatives.  Given the apparent inability of the political process
first under decentralisation and then under centralisation to offer educational
opportunities to disadvantaged children whose parents are locked into poor
neighbourhoods, the idea of offering these parents a way out by enabling them
to send their children to private schools has gained in appeal.
But what would be the overall impact of such a radical change into the existing
system of public schools?  To begin answering this question, we must first8
better understand what inputs other than spending are important for public
schools quality.
Let me turn, then, to what the academic literature tells us about this issue.
While debates about which inputs are important in yielding good school
outcomes are ongoing, much of the economics literature that attempts to
uncover relationships between school outcomes like test results and school
inputs like teacher characteristics and per pupil spending finds relatively little
evidence for an important role of school spending.  Rather, parental and child
characteristics within classrooms seem to dominate any measurable inputs that
are purchased by school boards, and some schools have been shown to be
better than others even when controlling for all the obvious measurable
differences between schools.  Holding other factors fixed, excessive
unionisation and centralisation of bureaucracies have been empirically linked to
relative declines in student achievements, while parental involvement through
parent teacher associations have been empirically linked to student gains.
While researchers are far from untangling all the various forces important within
complex public school institutions, the general  picture that is emerging does
suggest that courts in the United States have focused on the wrong measure
when targeting all state resources toward equalisation of spending across
schools.  The dismal results we have seen in states like California are then far
from surprising when viewed in light of this empirical evidence, and states like
California seem to have missed 30 years of opportunities to improve
educational outcomes by paying little attention to this evidence.9
With this picture of schools as more complex institutions in mind, we can then
turn to considering the specific roles played the two important actors in the
production of schools: parents and school bureaucracies.  Parents are
important in that they choose where to live, where to send their children to
school, how much to monitor their schools and how much to become personally
involved with them, and school bureaucracies are important in that their
efficiency in using resources and their flexibility to changing needs of children
seem crucially dependent on the institutions within which they operate.  We
want to understand vouchers better by understanding how changes in
incentives for these actors affects school inputs and institutions and then by
relating this understanding to what we know about school inputs and school
quality.  More specifically, we can ask how can vouchers change incentives and
institutions for these actors to accomplish what decades of centralisation and
equalisation have failed to bring about?
Holding fixed the nature of the institutions in which they operate, let us consider
parents first.  Their choices impact the quality of local public schools through at
least two distinct channels.  First, they directly impact schools by personally
becoming involved in them, exchanging information with teachers and
monitoring their performance.  Second, they indirectly determine school quality
by selecting into schools, either by choosing schools explicitly or by choosing
which school district to reside in, and thus they contribute to the characteristics
of the parent and student populations in the school of their choice.  Children that10
are more prepared at home, whose parents monitor their progress and who do
not add to disciplinary problems within schools contribute to a better school
environment in which the school’s resources can be used more effectively.  The
combination of the direct impact of parents and the indirect impact of their
selection into schools has given rise to the commonly discussed peer effect a
child brings to a school.  While we have strong evidence that such effects exist
and are important, they seem to differ across schools and across classrooms in
ways we have yet to understand fully.  It is important to recognise, however,
that peer effects operate through both parents and children even if the two can
often not easily be disentangles in empirical work.  A change in incentives may
lead to a change in parental choices in each of these areas thus influencing
school quality.
While we have learned much about inputs that are important for schools given
the particular institutional structure, and while we have recognised the
importance of peer effects through parents and children, we know less about
the role of school bureaucracies.  The historical and anecdotal evidence I have
discussed before suggests that centralisation of control leads to greater and
more entrenched school bureaucracies dominated by teacher unions, and
empirical evidence suggests that unionisation is negatively correlated with
school performance.  Furthermore, evidence of competition within the existing
school system in the US suggests that higher competition from either Catholic
schools or from a greater concentration of public schools tends to raise the
performance of public schools.  This evidence, however, is still sketchy and11
controversial, and it is premature to read too much into it.  But the general
sense that is emerging suggests a negative role for unions when isolated from
competition through a centralised school bureaucracy.  Furthermore, evidence
on the importance of parental monitoring of schools re-enforces this conclusion
in that parents are less likely to monitor schools that are controlled by large and
intransigent bureaucracies.
With these factors and the historical picture in mind, we can then begin our
analysis of private school vouchers by asking how such vouchers change the
incentives of parents and school bureaucracies and how these changes
combine to impact both public and private schools.  I propose to accomplish this
by starting with a very simple model and slowly adding complexity.  This allows
us to keep track of important effects and to trace the various channels through
which vouchers impact schools.  Let me state formally that what I mean by a
private school voucher here is a piece of paper denominated in dollars that
entitles parents to a refund from the state government for any private school
tuition expenses they incur up to the value of the voucher.  Eligible parents may
include all parents or just parents who live in particularly poor school districts or
parents of particularly modest means.  Vouchers can therefore be general in the
way Friedman suggested, or targeted to residents or districts who are
considered particularly needy.
Suppose first that we considered a single public school district with a single
public school and no current private schools in isolation.  For private school12
vouchers to have an impact in this setting, at least one private school would
have to emerge.  In order to compete effectively, this private school would have
to create an environment that is viewed by some parents as better than that
found in the public school, especially if its tuition is higher than the face value of
the voucher that is introduced.  Such a better environment can be generated in
three ways: First, if the public school currently operates inefficiently in that it
allows a school bureaucracy to successfully seek rents that do not impact
children positively, the private school can differentiate itself by using the same
resources more effectively and thus raising the marginal productivity of a dollar.
Second, to the extent that additional spending may be effective, the private
school can outspend public schools and thereby raise quality.  And third, the
private school has the advantage of being able to use both tuition rates and
admission standards to attract only those students who bring with them positive
peer effects.  Given that parental and child characteristics that produce positive
peer effects are empirically correlated with household income, setting tuition
rates above voucher levels would exclude low income parents.  Furthermore,
setting explicit admission standards can exclude lower ability children with
worse peer effects more directly.  Therefore, there is a tendency for private
schools to select on peer qualities which public schools have to take as given
and thus to skim the cream off the public school.  Empirical evidence suggests
that currently operating private schools in the US as well as private schools in
countries like Chile are at least somewhat using this strategy.  Of course, if
voucher levels are sufficiently high, additional private schools who target lower
income households with lower tuition levels may also emerge, but these schools13
too have an incentive to set high admission standards to keep out children with
low peer effects.  Public schools, on the other hand, to the extent that they are
currently operating inefficiently and to the extent that their bureaucracies benefit
from greater overall spending, have an incentive to retain students, and thus the
tax dollars that accompany those students, by improving their marginal
productivity of a dollar through less rent seeking.
In this simplistic setting, two forces therefore emerge.  Private schools will seek
to attract the best parents and students away from public schools in order to
compete effectively, while public schools will try to compete effectively by
becoming more efficient.  This classic tradeoff has captured the attention of
much of the academic literature as well as the public debate on vouchers.  If
one thinks that the major problem with public schools is their current
inefficiency, then it may be possible to argue that the cream skimming effect will
be outweighed by the increased efficiency of public schools to yield better public
schools under vouchers.  If, on the other hand, one thinks that public schools
are either already efficient or are unlikely to be able to overcome bureaucratic
barriers to improving efficiency, the cream skimming effect will dominate and
cause public schools to deteriorate.  This deterioration then causes additional
private schools to form and further exit from the public school which may
ultimately lead to all but the worst students to switch to some private school.
Such a possible collapse of public education lies at the core of the fears about
vouchers often raised by its opponents.14
The debate on vouchers as framed by this simple model encompasses much of
what is in the mind of advocates on both sides of this issue.  The model gives
us obviously important insights into two important tradeoffs.  However, I would
like to argue here that it is hardly the complete story.  The role of parents is
reduced to choosing between a public and a private school when I have
suggested before that parents also choose among public schools by their
choice of residence and, once choosing a school, they decide on some level of
involvement with that school.  Both these factors are ignored in our simple
model thus far.  Furthermore, public schools are modelled solely as inefficient
rent seekers without any details offered as to where all the inefficiencies of the
public sector may lie and precisely how they may be affected by policy changes.
I would therefore like to consider what additional forces might be introduced into
this simple view of parents and schools in light of what we have learned from
the historical and academic literatures.
Let me begin this process by considering the addition of household location
choices.  Whether under a centralised or a decentralised system of financing, all
schools are, in the end, local, and local public school do not operate in isolation
but rather as part of a larger system in which parents select into public school
districts based in large part on differences in perceived school quality.  Thus, as
I have argued above, the public school system is already characterised by
schools that are far from homogeneous, with more motivated parents of higher
means selecting into better school districts protected from outside pressures
through elevated property values.  An important additional factor that is15
therefore introduced once we expand our simple model to include multiple
school districts is that, in the absence of private schools, a parent’s choice of
where to live is intimately linked with that parent’s choice of where to send his or
her child to school.  The introduction of a private school voucher severs that link
and allows parents to make separate housing and schooling choices.  Given the
overwhelming evidence that current residential location choices at least in the
US are in large part determined by school district considerations, such a
severing of the link between where one lives and where one goes to school
should have major implications for how residential location choices are
determined, and given that parental and child characteristics are an important
input into the production of good schools, such changes in residential locations
may impact school quality in important ways.
Suppose, then, that we expanded our simple one district model to include a
second district, and suppose that prior to the introduction of vouchers, parents
have selected into these districts based at least in some part on the schools in
those districts.  If everyone cares equally about schools, then higher income
individuals will live in the better school district, and property values there will be
higher.  Now suppose that a voucher program is introduced, and suppose first
that households cannot move across school districts.  This leaves us with the
simple model from before in which each public school simply competes with the
threat of an emerging private school.  Under the assumption of no household
mobility, it is then unclear where a private school will emerge first: If public
schools are sufficiently bad in the poor district, it may well be that private16
schools targeted to higher income/higher ability children from that district form
there without private schools forming in the better school district.  Of course it is
equally plausible that, if public schools in the poor district are not too bad,
private schools first emerge in the wealthy district and attract high income/high
ability children there.  Now suppose, however, that households can move after
the voucher policies are introduced.  So long as acceptable houses and
neighbourhoods within the poor district can be found or created, any household
from the wealthy community who chooses to switch to a private school would
move to the poorer community in order to pay less for housing which is more
expensive in the rich community merely because of the presence of good public
schools.  Such house price differences are empirically huge, with houses in the
good school district of Palo Alto where I live, for example, selling at a premium
of two to four hundred thousand dollars just because of that community’s better
schools.  Note that this difference of housing prices in Palo Alto emerges not
because of school spending which is centrally controlled in California, but rather
because of other factors that cause public schools in Palo Alto to be viewed as
superior to other public schools.  Were Palo Alto to also be allowed to choose
its own funding levels in a more local system, these differences in house values
would be even greater.
For the same reasons that public schools are a segregating force in US society,
private school vouchers therefore introduce a desegregating force.  Of course,
neighbourhood and community choices by households are not exclusively
determined by school considerations, which implies that the decoupling of17
location and schooling choices through vouchers will not achieve a complete
mixing of households in the way that may have existed during historical times
when such mixing was economically necessary.  Even modest migrations of
middle income households into poorer communities, however, could set off a
chain of events that might be economically quite significant.  In particular, the
greater attractiveness of poorer communities would cause property values there
to rise and property values in wealthier communities to fall, and the migration of
some middle income households could change the characteristics of
neighbourhoods within poorer areas.  In a model that I will discuss in some
more detail during our panel discussion this afternoon and during a seminar
tomorrow, I have attempted to incorporate neighbourhood externalities and
amenities as well as differences in housing stocks across communities, and I
have calibrated these to various data sets for the US.  Voucher simulations in
this model, under the assumption that public schools are already efficient
without vouchers, consistently indicate that the change in migrations from an
introduction of private school vouchers could reduce interdistrict differences in
incomes and property values by one half, indicating that about one half of the
current income segregation across communities is due to the prevalence of
local public schools.  Furthermore, this model is likely to under rather than
overstate such effects because it assumes that neighbourhoods amenities and
externalities remain unchanged as these migrations occur and that only
property values of existing neighbourhoods would change to equilibrate the
supply and demand of housing.18
When combined with parental location decisions, the decisions of some parents
to send their children to newly emerging private schools that skim the cream off
public schools thus cause a decrease in residential income segregation.  While
this may indeed be a positive development in a system whose equity problems
arise precisely because of the existence of residential segregation, it remains
an open question to what extent this will actually improve educational
opportunities for children.  Several consequences from these migrations arise:
First, private schools are likely to arise in poor communities, both because
current high ability households there are likely to choose such schools and
because households from other communities are likely to migrate there to pay
lower housing prices and send their children to private schools.  This prediction
is at least somewhat confirmed by the experience in California in the 1970's
when public school spending was equalised across districts.  During a short
period of 5 years, the number of private schools in California doubled, and a
vast majority of these schools arose in low income, low school quality districts.
Second, in the absence of efficiency gains in the public sector, public schools in
general are still likely to suffer as they did in our original one community setting
because of the cream skimming by emerging private schools.  However, the
declines in public school quality would occur in all communities, not just in those
that experience an increase in the number of private schools, and my
simulations suggest that declines in wealthy communities will be larger than
those in poor communities.  Third, those communities in which private schools
arise derive a fiscal benefit due to increases in property values and decreases
in the number of students attending public schools.  These fiscal benefits are19
even more important under local funding of public schools because the
presence of a large number of households attending private schools acts much
like a matching grant for these communities, as such households continue to
pay local public school taxes without utilising their services.  General private
school voucher programs are therefore likely to not only offer increased
educational choices to parents of high ability children in poor communities but
also fiscal benefits to those parents and students in poor communities who
remain in the public school system.
Table 1 demonstrates these effects quite starkly.  This table presents estimates
from simulations using my model in which parental location and schooling
choices are undertaken simultaneously and which is calibrated to data from the
state of New York.  The top portion of the table reports estimates of variances in
household incomes within and across communities for different voucher levels
ranging from $1000 to $6000, and the lower portion does the same for property
values.  Note that within community variances increase while across community
variances decline dramatically. Vouchers cause households to residentially
integrate.
Next, Table 2 reports variances in school related variables ranging from per
pupil spending and average abilities to average peer levels and overall school
quality measures.  These variances are presented both for students attending
public schools and for all students who initially attended public schools but may
have switched to private schools under the voucher program, and it presents20
them both for the case of a version of the model that assumes mobility of
households and one that does not.  Note what a difference the extension of the
model to include mobility of households makes: while variance measures
increase dramatically in the lower part of the table where households are
assumed to be immobile, they narrow considerably in the top part.  In societies
like the US in which close to 20 percent of urban households move in any given
year, the inclusion of mobility in our thinking about education policy is therefore
not only appropriate but may also be quite crucial.  Furthermore, results do not
change dramatically when the model is calibrated to the more centralised
school system of California rather than the system in New York which still
operates under some local funding.
In our short hour here this morning, I do not have the time to present to you in
detail the precise way in which these estimates were arrived at, but I have made
every attempt in this numerical analysis to both incorporate as much realism
into the model as is possible with the available data and to avoid incorporating
features that would bias the results in favour of vouchers.  The analysis includes
high, middle and low income school districts, where each district contains
different neighbourhoods whose characteristics are calibrated to house price
data.  Households in the model are assumed to differ in incomes and ability
levels, and are assumed to choose between neighbourhoods, school districts
and public and private schools.  School quality is determined through a
combination of average spending as well as average parental and student
characteristics within schools in a way that is consistent with the data, and21
public schools are funded through property and income taxes that are
determined in a political process as they are in most US states today.  Private
schools emerge only when demand for them arises, and public schools are
already assumed to operate efficiently.  The results I have presented in the
previous tables, therefore, arise purely from changes in parental choices
resulting from the addition of multiple communities to a simpler one community
version.
The recognition of these kinds of migration effect also has strong policy
implications for designing more targeted voucher initiatives.  Until now, we have
analysed general voucher programs accessible to all parents, but some
proposals in the US involve targeting vouchers only to residents of low income
communities while others involve targeting only to households with incomes
below a certain threshold.  If my estimates of migration effects are correct, then
targeting vouchers to low income communities would entail effects quite similar
to those I have described thus far because it is precisely in those communities
that private schools would emerge even under a general voucher program and
targeting to resident within low income communities does not prevent higher
income households from other communities to migrate to poor school districts.
If, on the other hand, vouchers are targeted to low income households, voucher
use would be significantly less than under community targeting as middle and
high income households can no longer migrate to poorer communities to take
advantage of private education.  Targeting to individuals rather than22
communities therefore isolates public schools in middle and high income
communities from competition that arises from migration.
While the results presented thus far point to important additional effects which
arise when parental location choices are introduced into an efficiently operating
public school system, the analysis ignores issues arising from current
inefficiencies of public education.  Rather than lumping all possible inefficiencies
into one category as many models of public schools have done in the past, let
me be more explicit here by distinguishing between three distinct ways in which
such inefficiencies may arise.  First, as was suggested by our initial one
community model, public school bureaucracies may operate inefficiently in
environments in which they are largely isolated from competition; that is, public
schools may utilise current resources inefficiently.  Second, given that
residential and school choices are connected in a public school system, child
abilities and talents may not be well matched to public schools, although the
incorporation of migration allows some matching from residential location
choices to emerge.  And third, public schools may make inefficient use of
parents and the information they bring to the schools.  To the extent that these
factors are important, we can expand the model presented so far to simulate
how the introduction of vouchers may alter these inefficiencies.
First, we can add back to the model the competitive effect that was left out in
the tables I have presented where it was assumed that public schools are, in
fact, utilising resources efficiently.  This is the most common argument put forth23
in favour of vouchers.  The addition of this effect into the simulations of course
increases the policy appeal of vouchers, and, to the extent that competition is
felt mainly in the district in which private schools arise, it benefits poor districts
relatively more than middle income and wealthy districts.  However, I have
spent much of my time attempting to persuade you that migrations from middle
and high income communities are likely to be quite strong, which implies that
even public schools in districts that do not experience the formation of private
schools might respond to competitive pressures if they care about losing certain
types of desirable students.  To what extent such competitive effects from
vouchers are likely to arise, and to what extent they are likely to spread
throughout the pubic school system as opposed to being concentrated in
districts with poor public schools is an open question.  As I have mentioned
before, however, empirical evidence from existing school competition suggests
that we ought to expect at least some effects of this kind.  Furthermore, to the
extent that teacher unions are responsible for existing inefficiencies in public
schools, competition is likely to weaken their power, which may be one of the
reasons that public school teacher unions currently compose the major political
force against vouchers in the United States.
A second and more neglected source of inefficiency in public schools, however,
arise from possibly inefficient matching of students with schools rather than an
inefficient utilisation of resources within schools.  This manifests itself in the
models of public schools that are commonly employed, including those I have
discussed thus far, through the way in which peer effects are incorporated.24
Specifically, it is usually assumed that mixing children with different abilities
benefits low ability children while hurting high ability children, an assumption
that seems reasonable when the curriculum is designed in such a way as to
attempt to teach all children the same material.  Under such a school
curriculum, one which closely approximates many current US public schools,
parents who insure classrooms are functioning properly are benefiting everyone
in that classroom, and high ability children are able to serve as mentors and role
models for low ability children.  A model of school quality that places emphasis
on average peer qualities therefore seems both reasonable and consistent with
empirical estimates under this setting.
However, imagine an environment in which schools specialise to target specific
skills and abilities of their student populations, a system that is more like that
currently in place in many European countries.  Then it is no longer obvious that
average ability levels within schools should matter in the way we have modelled
thus far.  If some schools attempt to train future economists while others train
future carpenters, there is no reason to believe that the joint presence in one
classroom of the future economist and the future carpenter will benefit either - in
fact, I could relate personal anecdotes to suggest that the future economist is
likely to be harmful to the future carpenter as he attempts to operate a
chainsaw.  If schools alter their curricula to meet student needs as schools
become more homogeneous, it is therefore more appropriate to model both
average abilities and variances in abilities as mattering in schools, where higher
variances would lead to lower school quality.  It is furthermore appropriate to25
differentiate between different kinds of abilities and not to lump all talents that
children are endowed with into one category.
When schools are permitted to target their curriculum to student needs and
when the model of peer effects is adjusted to take this into account, my model
continues to predict migration effects of the type discussed so far, but now the
increased homogeneity of student populations in both public and private
schools lends itself to a much different normative interpretation.  In particular,
private schools now become more attractive due to their ability to target
curricula, and pubic schools, to the extent that they are able to also target their
resources in the same way as they become smaller and more homogeneous,
are able to compete more effectively as voucher levels increase.  While public
school quality declined when such curriculum targeting was not permitted,
public school quality in poor communities is now the first to increase as it is the
first to experience declining enrolments and greater homogeneity.  As general
ability levels fall in these schools, their variance also narrows, and a targeted
curriculum can more than compensate for the absence of future physicists in
the classroom.  Note that this is not an argument involving public school
bureaucracies inefficiently using resources.  Rather, it is an argument about
better matching of resources made possible by greater differentiation of both
public and private schools.  To what extent public schools will be able under
vouchers to undertake such curriculum targeting is, of course, an empirical
matter, and it is likely to depend on the institutions faced by the public school
bureaucracy.  In highly centralised systems like that in California, such targeting26
by local public schools may be difficult to achieve, thus leaving us with declining
public school quality in the presence of vouchers.  In states with greater local
autonomy, however, the possibility of targeting public school curricula as public
school populations change is more likely.  Curriculum design, therefore,
involves better matching of school resources to student needs, and the
possibility of heterogeneity in school curricula causes us to view peer effects
quite differently than we would in the absence of such a possibility.
Finally, not only might public school inefficiencies arise from inefficient utilisation
of resources and inefficient matching of children to schools, public school
bureaucracies may also be either unable or unwilling to utilise parents
efficiently.  Current empirical work by one of my graduate students suggests
that information and monitoring from parents is quite important and highly
correlated with household income, and that the effectiveness of parental
monitoring at improving schools increases as schools face more competitive
environments.  In addition, of course, parents who decide on how much to
monitor consider their potential impact on schools prior to engaging in costly
monitoring efforts.  Economic theory tells us that monitoring by parents should
increase as schools become smaller because the free rider problem is
mitigated.  Similarly, as parents within schools become more homogeneous,
their ability to solve coordination problems involved in monitoring schools
increases.  To the extent that this is true, the smaller and more homogeneous
schools under competition are likely to lead to more effective parental
involvement in both public and private schools.27
Table 3 attempts to summarise numerical estimates of adding these various
considerations to my simpler model from before, and it does so for a version of
the model calibrated to New York City which has a centralised structure of
public school finance.  The table reports school averages for students attending
public schools as well as for all student who attend public school in the absence
of vouchers.  The simulated voucher level in this table is a modest $2,500.
The first two columns present outcomes when the model contains none of these
additional features, one for the case of no voucher and the other for the case of
the $2,500 voucher.  The introduction of this voucher causes 14 percent of
children to switch to private schools, two thirds of whom previously attended
public schools in middle to high income districts but now move to low income
districts to attend private schools.  Parental income and child ability levels within
public schools therefore decline, as does average public school quality.  At the
same time, those children who switch to private schools gain from
improvements in their school quality, and average school quality across all
students remains roughly unchanged.
The next set of columns adds the standard competitive effect of vouchers by
assuming that the marginal product of resources within public schools improves
when these schools are faced with private school competition.  Two versions of
this effect are modelled. In the first column, the positive competitive effect
occurs only in districts in which private schools emerge.  This causes a slight28
decline in private school enrolments to 13 percent, and an increase in the
average quality of public schools in the poor community.  If, however, the
competitive effect of private schools in poor districts spills over into middle and
high income districts due to migration pressures that such districts experience,
public schools everywhere become more competitive thus causing private
school enrolments to decline to 10 percent and overall public school quality to
improve further despite the decline in peer quality within those schools.
Columns 5 and 6, on the other hand, return to the assumption that public
schools are using resources efficiently and  incorporates the potential for
schools to better match their  curriculum with student needs as student
populations become more homogeneous.  Column 5 assumes that only private
schools undertake such curriculum targeting, while Column 6 allows public
schools to do the same.  In the former case, private schools become more
attractive and lead to greater attendance rates but poorer public school
performance as more high quality peers exit, while in the latter case, public
schools respond to this competition and therefore improve in quality.  Finally,
Column 7 allows for parental input and monitoring to become more effective as
schools become smaller.  This gives an additional advantage to private schools
and also to the public schools in poor communities who experience declining
enrolment.
The main message of this table is that the equity enhancing migration effects
described earlier are immune to the addition of other types of effects, and that29
these other effects only serve to increase the efficiency properties of vouchers.
Table 4 then zeroes in more closely on the equity properties of the school
system by focusing on variances of the same variables across students.  For
ease of interpretation, these variances are normalised to 1 in the absence of
vouchers, with variances below 1 implying a narrowing of differences and
variances above 1 implying a widening of these differences.  Notice that
because of migration effects, variances in public school quality decline as
vouchers are introduced, as do variances across all students, both public and
private.  Furthermore, these declines are generally amplified as additional
effects are modelled.  The only variance measures that increase are those of
household income and child ability within schools because all schools, both
public and private, become more homogeneous under the voucher policies, but
this clearly does not mean that school quality variances increase.  Finally, the
last two rows in the table again demonstrate the powerful residential integration
produced by the decoupling of residential location and schooling choices, with
variances in both district income and property values narrowing sharply.
What I am attempting to argue, then, is that discussions of vouchers require a
deeper analysis than that usually offered by simple models pitting a single
public school against a private school.  Lessons from the history of school
reforms and from scholarly empirical analysis have painted a picture of schools
as far more complex institutions producing a product that is influenced by the
various choices made by parents and school bureaucracies who respond to
institutional incentives.  School vouchers change the incentives faced by these30
agents.  Parents are able to choose schooling independent of housing, which
implies greater residential integration that brings with it much better equity
properties than a more simple analysis would imply.  While the fears by some
that schools will become increasingly differentiated under voucher policies are
well founded, this greater differentiation between schools does not have to
imply greater inequities in educational opportunities.  In fact, under some
plausible scenarios, the greater differentiation of schools leads to greater equity
and greater efficiency in both public and private schooling.  Such results, of
course, are dependent on a variety of assumptions which I have attempted to
make explicit during my discussion.
With decentralisation of public schools leading to the types of equity concerns
prevalent in the US, and with centralisation shown to be both ineffective in
addressing these inequities as well as contributing to greater inefficiency,
vouchers may therefore be able to introduce equity and efficiency into the public
system, whether it be centralised or decentralised.  In the spirit of healthy
academic scepticism, of course, I should conclude by pointing out that while I
have made every attempt in my numerical analysis to use the available
evidence to inform a simulation model, results are still derived from a model, not
from real world experiments.  I believe we can learn much about the relevant
issues we should be thinking about from such an approach and we can get a
first order sense of the magnitude of likely effects.  Ultimately, however, there is
no substitute for real world experiments and solid empirical work with data from
such experiments to determine the magnitudes of these effects more precisely.31
TABLE 1
Variances within and across Communities
 Variance in  Income Values
Vouch Comm. 1 Comm 2 Comm 3 Across
$0 1.7048 3.0709 1.0025 2.5739
$1000 3.4500 2.2214 1.3639 2.1549
$2000 5.0900 2.1725 2.0025 1.4117
$3000 5.4600 3.3500 1.9100 0.9267
$4000 4.3400 4.7600 2.1600 0.7467
$5000 4.6822 5.3281 3.1625 0.1091
$6000 2.3539 3.6461 3.5025 1.3325
Variance in Property Values
Vouch Comm. 1 Comm 2 Comm 3 Across
$0 0.0652 0.1469 0.2331 0.2175
$1000 0.0600 0.1309 0.2195 0.2016
$2000 0.0612 0.1270 0.2081 0.1946
$3000 0.1556 0.1262 0.1824 0.1001
$4000 0.1690 0.1210 0.1768 0.0695
$5000 0.2223 0.3148 0.1393 0.0466
$6000 0.1787 0.2809 0.3739 0.0930
Source:  Thomas Nechyba, “Mobility, Targeting and Private School Vouchers,” Stanford
University working paper, 199832
TABLE 2
Full Mobility
Variance Across Public School Students Variance Across All Students
Vouch Spending Ability Peers Quality Spending Ability Peers Quality
$0 0.0256 0.7780 0.0306 0.0276 0.0256 0.7780 0.0306 0.0276
$1000 0.0257 0.5360 0.0277 0.0279 0.0250 1.3535 0.0370 0.0288
$2000 0.0255 0.3837 0.0227 0.0275 0.0236 2.1945 0.0422 0.0280
$3000 0.0206 0.0212 0.0138 0.0175 0.0185 5.5197 0.0664 0.0236
$4000 0.0135 0.1382 0.0141 0.0133 0.0136 7.2392 0.0750 0.0210
$5000 0.0127 0.7233 0.0179 0.0177 0.0314 10.4334 0.0835 0.0345
$6000 **** **** **** **** 0.0344 11.0413 0.0933 0.0476
No Mobility
Variance Across Public School Student Variance Across All Students
Vouch Spending Ability Peers Quality Spending Ability Peers Quality
$0 0.0256 0.7780 0.0306 0.0276 0.0256 0.7780 0.0306 0.0276
$1000 0.0259 0.8120 0.0308 0.0281 0.0259 0.8120 0.0308 0.0281
$2000 0.0259 0.8120 0.0308 0.0281 0.0259 0.8120 0.0308 0.0281
$3000 0.0339 1.6673 0.0434 0.0375 0.0324 2.2388 0.0439 0.0352
$4000 0.0501 2.7694 0.0668 0.0532 0.0419 4.7148 0.0651 0.0429
$5000 0.0417 5.8064 0.0953 0.0620 0.0495 7.1608 0.0731 0.0512
$6000 0.0208 2.2043 0.2076  0.0316 0.0497 8.3204 0.0620 0.0480
Source:  Thomas Nechyba, “Mobility, Targeting and Private School Vouchers,” Stanford
University working paper, 1998.33
TABLE 3

























% Switch to Priv.
Sch.
--- 14.2 13.1 10.5 18.9 13.8 17.5
Pub. School
Means
  Per Pupil ($) 8,103 8,021 8,051 8,098 8,011 8,067 8,002
  Household
Income ($)
34,321 29,723 29,892 30,871 28,948 29,735 29,647
  Child Ability* 6.20 5.86 5.91 6.01 5.74 5.89 5.76
  School
Quality**
7.83 7.55 7.88 8.11 7.41 8.01 7.71
Across all
Students***
  Per Pupil ($) 8,103 7,822 7,891 7,932 7,901 7,872 7,864
  Household
Income ($)
34,321 34,321 34,321 34,321 34,321 34,321 34,321
  Child Ability* 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20 6.20
  School
Quality**
7.83 7.84 8.02 8.39 8.17 8.42 8.36
*  The Child ability levels are arbitrarily calibrated to lie between 1 and 10.
**  School quality arises endogenously from the combination of per pupil
spending, per pupil household income, and average child ability in the
school. For purposes of this calculation, all values are scaled to lie
between 0 and 10. While there is thus no natural interpretation for the
magnitude of a particular school quality level, we emphasise here the
direction and magnitude of change in the variable as we move across the
table.
***  Note that "all students" here refers to all students that are initially in the
public school system before the introduction of vouchers. Therefore, the
values in the first column are identical to those for public schools.
Source:  Thomas Nechyba and Michael Heise, “School Finance Reform: Introducing the
Choice Factor,” Stanford University working paper, 1998.34
TABLE 4



























  Per Pupil ($) 1.0 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.96
  Household
Income ($)
1.0 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.89 0.92 0.93
  Child Ability** 1.0 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.78 0.71 0.75
  School
Quality***
1.0 0.88 0.72 0.91 0.94 0.69 0.71
Across all
Schools
  Per Pupil ($) 1.0 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.94
  Household
Income ($)
1.0 1.32 1.33 1.24 1.43 1.31 1.38
  Child Ability** 1.0 1.18 1.17 1.15 1.24 1.19 1.21
  School
Quality***





1.0 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.67 0.70 0.68
  Property
Values
1.0 0.61 0.59 0.64 0.56 0.61 0.59
*  Note that, in order to ease interpretation, these variance values are scaled
in various ways to all equal 1 for the base case of no vouchers. Our
emphasis here is therefore not on absolute but rather on relative
magnitudes across columns.
**  The Child ability levels are arbitrarily calibrated to lie between   1 and 10.
*** School quality arises endogenously from the combination of per pupil
spending, per pupil household income, and average child ability in the
school. For purposes of this calculation, all values are scaled to lie
between 0 and 10. While there is thus no natural interpretation for the
magnitude of a particular school quality level, we emphasise here the
direction and magnitude of change in the variable as we move across the
table.
Source:  Thomas Nechyba and Michael Heise, “School Finance Reform: Introducing the Choice
Factor,” Stanford University working paper, 1998.